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Abstract—Purpose of access is one of the core concepts in
privacy which considers the data user’s intent as a factor in
making access control decisions and enforcement of purpose
is required to ensure that data is used as what it intends
for. In general, the enforcement of purpose is a complicated
task. The main difficulty is how to identify the purpose of an
agent when it requests to perform an action. In this paper,
we discuss the design issue of purpose enforcement based on
our proposed (defined) enforcement structure: pre-enforcement,
ongoing-enforcement, and post-enforcement. We also propose an
enforcement solution for usage control designed for distributed
healthcare information system, particularly, the pre-enforcement
of purpose (the validation of claimed purpose at the initial state
before data is granted access).
Keywords-purpose enforcement; distributed healthcare; secu-
rity; privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
In dictionary, “purpose” is defined as “the object towards
which one strives or for which something exists; an aim or
a goal”. However, by observing how purpose is used in the
natural language reveals that purposes often refer to an or a
set of abstract actions. For example, accessing patient’s health
record for the purpose of treatment, research, insurance, etc.
all of which are names of some abstract actions. Jafari et al
[5] classified “purpose” in two types: purpose as high-level
action and purpose as future action.
Purpose as a high-level action refers to a more abstract,
or semantically higher-level action in a plan. Thus, doing
something for some purpose, actually means doing it as a
part, or a sub-action, for that higher-level action. For example,
when Bob checks some patient’s blood pressure record for
the purpose of heart surgery, it means that checking the blood
pressure is a part of a more complex and abstract action of
heart surgery. Similarly, surgery is performed for the purpose
of treatment, it is because the high-level action of medical
treatment includes surgery as a part.
Purpose as a future action is used to indicate that an action
is performed as a prerequisite of another action in future. For
example, when Bob withdraws money from a bank account
for the purpose of paying the bills, it means the former action
is done as a prerequisite to performing the latter.
To Jafari et al [5], the enforcement of purpose means to
verify that those abstract actions exist and they are valid before
data is released to requester. In some contexts, they need also
to be valid during the usage of data. Identifying purpose of
action is the main difficulty in purpose enforcement. Some
common proposed mechanisms for purpose management and
enforcement are self-declaration in which the agent explicitly
announces the purpose of data access [3] and role-based
enforcement [7] in which the purpose is identified based on the
agent’s role in the system. The first method obviously cannot
stop a malicious agent from claiming false purposes. This is
because anyone can claim any purpose of access, without the
proper system to validate claimed purpose, this method can
not be used in data processing environment like distributed
healthcare [1][2]. The second method has been criticized to
be inefficient in capturing purpose of an action since roles
and purposes are not always aligned and members of the
same organizational role may practice different purposes in
their actions. Therefore, identifying the purpose of action or
verifying the claimed purpose remains an open question.
This paper addresses two main issues: (a) propose the pur-
pose enforcement structure. (b) propose the design of purpose
validation for the three validation phases (pre-, ongoing-, and
post- enforcement) for distributed healthcare.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the motivation and related work. Section III talks
about the purpose enforcement structure. We present a purpose
enforcement model in Section IV and a prototype of the
proposed model in Section V. Section VI is the conclusion
and future work.
II. MOTIVATION AND RELATED WORK
Purpose is raised and argued in many literatures as an
important entity used to control access to sensitive private data.
Byun et al [3][9] proposed a purpose-based access control
model of complex data for privacy protection, a model that
relies on the well-known RBAC [4] access control model as
well as the notion of conditional role which is based on the
concept of role attribute and system attribute. In their paper,
they provided also a general purpose tree applied in complex
data management system and a solution to address the problem
of how to determine the purpose for which certain data are
accessed by a given user.
Jafari et al [5] defined a semantic model for purpose, based
on which purpose-based privacy policies can be expressed and
enforced in a business system. The model is based on the
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intuition that the purpose of an action is determined by its
situation among other inter-related actions. Actions and their
relationships can be modeled in the form of an action graph. A
modal logic and model checking algorithm are developed for
formal expression of purpose-based policies and for verifying
whether a particular system complies with them.
Concerning enforcement, Katt et al [8] proposed the exten-
sion of UCONABC [10] with continuous control usage ses-
sions for expressing the ongoing-check obligation. They also
proposed the general, continuity-enhanced policy enforcement
engine for usage control applied particularly to obligation.
After the thorough study on the work of Katt et al, we
found that the model can be extended and used to enforce the
ongoing-enforcement of purpose. We will discuss it in detail
in the following section.
Jafari et al [6] proposed an approach to enforce purpose
in access control systems that uses workflows. They proposed
to encode purposes as properties of workflows used by orga-
nizations. However, the proposed model does not work with
“purpose” that does not have a natural interpretation in terms
of workflows, particularly, more abstract purposes.
III. PURPOSE ENFORCEMENT STRUCTURE
“Purpose” has been considered in major privacy legislations
1 where the processing of sensitive private data is bounded
to the specific purpose and the excessive use of them are
prohibited. With this regard, in any processing environment
dealing with such data requires great attention to make sure
that system can provide adequate data processing security
aligning with privacy legislation. This leads to the necessity of
the effective management of purpose binding of data (includ-
ing the recognition of purpose binding data) and enforcement.
Observing how data is processed in the real world reveals
that there are three crucial states that need to be considered for
the enforcement of purpose: before access is granted (initial
state), during the usage of data, and after using it. However,
the three enforcement states require different mechanisms
to handle them. We term the three enforcement states as
pre-enforcement, ongoing-enforcement, and post-enforcement
respectively. Figure 1 shows the purpose enforcement structure
with the three enforcement states.
1Privacy legislations: the European 95/46/EC Directive, U.S Privacy Act
(1974), and Canada’s Federal Privacy Act (1983)
• Pre-enforcement refers to a mechanism allowing the
system to validate the purpose before granting access
to data. At this stage, the user’s request in which the
purpose of access is mentioned is validated by the system.
If the system finds that the claimed-purpose is not valid,
it rejects request immediately without going further into
the detail evaluation of the usage policy. For example, in
emergency case, if doctor declares “emergency purpose”
in order to bypass the rule to access patient’s record
and if system can not prove the existence of “emergency
situation”, then the request is rejected.
• Ongoing-enforcement refers to a mechanism allowing the
system to continuously control purpose of usage during
the usage period. It checks if the actions performed
and the requesting actions comply with the claimed
purpose. During the usage, system periodically triggers
the re-evaluation of purpose, this intends to check if
the purpose of access is still valid given the change
of time. Ongoing-enforcement can be called “controlling
and guiding method” because it acts as a controller and
also a guide for user. It tells the user which action is
allowed for which purpose.
• Post-enforcement refers to a mechanism allowing the
system to validate the processing of data and to identify
if the usage of data was in line with the claimed purpose
or otherwise. This enforcement is done after the usage
of data. This mechanism can also be called a pro-active
enforcement, it does not provide ongoing control of the
data usage, instead it provides a way to prove the correct-
ness of the data usage by means of the log information.
Auditing mechanisms are required to analyze the log-
information and to reconstruct the execution process in
order to find out if a violation happened or not.
With the above consideration, we see that to ensure the
correctness of data usage, the purpose in those three states
must be maintained. To support this enforcement structure, we
propose the enforcement model as presented in next section.
IV. PURPOSE ENFORCEMENT MODEL
In this section, we present in detail the purposed-based
usage enforcement model applied in distributed healthcare
information system. The enforcement model focuses on the
system architecture and functional modules to illustrate how
the enforcement can be achieved. The proposed architecture
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considers all the UCON core model [11] and it is inspired
partly from the work of Katt et al [8]. As illustrated in
Figure 2, the model consists of four core components: Purpose
Validation Point (PVP), Enforcement Point (EP), Decision
Point (DP), and Session Management Point (SMP) with other
supplementary modules like Usage Policy, Access/Usage His-
tory, Decision Needed Information (DNI) or Information Point
(IP), and Information system for purpose validation.
1) DP is responsible for making the access decisions during
a usage control session. It consists of two decision-
making components:
• Attribute Decision Function (ADF) handles the
attribute-based access decision during a usage ses-
sion. Attributes can be either subject, object, or envi-
ronment attributes (e.g., the subject’s identification).
The information required by ADF is retrieved from
DNI.
• Obligation Decision Function (ODF) makes the
decision whether a specific obligation has been ful-
filled. The DP checks the fulfillment of an obligation
by transforming it into an ordered sequence of
system actions, which should be defined for all obli-
gations (e.g., notification, the system may requires
to check if an email address is valid, and if it is
valid, the further check is if the notification message
is successfully sent out through the provided mail
address). During the obligation fulfillment check
process, in case, the DP requires more information
needed in obligation evaluation process, it contacts
DNI.
2) PVP makes the decision whether a purpose is valid or
not. Whenever there is a request, PVP checks the request
based on the claimed purpose. To validate the usage
purpose, PVP contacts the purpose information system
consisting of different modules responsible for providing
the information concerning different types of purpose
(Figure 2). Below are the details of those components.
• “Role to purpose alignment” provides the infor-
mation concerning the alignment between the re-
quester’s role and the purpose of access. For ex-
ample, a requester in role of ”cardiologist” may
be aligned to the ”heart surgery purpose”. This
information can be used for the pre-enforcement of
purpose, particularly, at the initial state of access.
However using the role to purpose alignment alone
may not be an effective solution to the problem as
roles and purposes are not always aligned. Thus, this
information needs to be used in conjunction with
other information from other modules presented
below.
• “Action to purpose alignment” provides the informa-
tion concerning the alignment between the actions
on object and the purpose. For example, action
”transfer” is aligned to the “emergency purpose”.
However, like “role to purpose”, “action to purpose”
can be used only as the complement to other mod-
ules for purpose enforcement.
• “Data to purpose alignment” provides the infor-
mation concerning the alignment between type of
object (resource or data) and purpose. For example,
data concerning surgery may be aligned to the
request for “surgery purpose”.
• “Medical treatment registration”, in general, patient
needs to register for the medical check, the reg-
istration information can be used to prove if the
purpose claimed by the requester is inline with
the treatment of the patient. For instance, if the
patient registered for general normal medical check,
the requester’s (e.g, doctor or physician) claim of
purpose as ”emergency” is not valid.
• “Room reservation (operation room or emergency
room)” provides the information concerning the
room reservation for each operation. This module
is designed as the source of information in case
of emergency situation. For example, in case of
emergency situation, the access rule on data may
be bypassed; hence, operation room reservation can
be the source of information to validate the claimed-
purpose.
• “Consent/authorization” provides the information
about who is particularly authorized for which pur-
poses. This module is designed to be used for two
purpose categories: Administrative and the others
(including research or health insurance ). This mod-
ule is administrated by the trusted entity that has
the authority to align a particular user or a group of
users to the particular purposes. For example, user
“Bob” can access patient’s record for “research”
purpose.
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3) EP handles the request from the subject and forwards it
to purpose validation point and then to decision point
through session management point for further policy
evaluation. If the usage request is granted by DP, then
EP allows the subject to access resource, else, a denying
message is sent to subject.
4) SMP is the module that manages individual usage ses-
sion. This includes requesting required decision(s) from
concerning modules (ADF and ODF) in each state dur-
ing the usage session. When a usage request is received,
EP forwards it to SMP. SMP sends corresponding de-
cision requests to DP. Then DP launches a checking
process for all the concerned modules such as ADF
and ODF. If all the requirements are fulfilled, DP sends
granting message to SMP and SMP forwards it to EP. In
case a negative decision is received, SMP sends a denial
response to EP. In the accessing state, the SMP monitors
continuously related subject, object, and environment
attributes, as well as any further actions requested by
the subject. According to the decision received from DP,
SMP either revokes the ongoing access by sending a
revoked response to EP, or keeps permitting access.
Remark: in general, “purpose” is included in the policy and
the enforcement of it can be done after the decision by
Decision Point (Figure 2). However, in our proposed model,
we consider purpose validation as a separate module. This
module examines the purpose of access at the early state,
before even the usage session starts. The logic behind this
is that we intend to maximize the performance of the system.
If we let everything be processed at the DP, it would take
considerable time in case the purpose of access is not valid
because PDP may also evaluate other parameters in policy.
Thus, we adopt the multi-tier control approach by having
purpose validation first and then the detail UCON policy
evaluation second [11] .
V. MODEL IMPLEMENTATION
To show the functionality of our proposed model, we
designed a concrete usage control enforcement engine as
presented in Figure 4. We then developed and tested a proof-
of-concept prototype in Java program. Furthermore, in order to
utilize and facilitate the existing standards and frameworks in
the area of access control, XACML “enterprise-java-xacml”2
is used in this prototype as a core policy evaluation engine.
Given that the usage enforcement should be done in a remote
client platform, we have no control over the remote system.
That requires trust establishment between the service provider
and the remote client before any data is released. While the
trust issue goes beyond the scope of this paper, we assume
that the remote client is trusted before the usage control policy
enforcement takes place.
Concerning the meta model and the state transition model
applied to Figure 2 (e.g, a state transition model for SMP),
we adopted the model proposed by Katt et al [8] and Zhang
et al [11] respectively.
A. Prototype
In our eHealth scenario, the doctor requests patient’s health
record from the Healthcare Information System (HIS). After
authenticating and authorizing the doctor based on his/her role
and a purpose of access, the HIS releases the record and a
usage policy in one encrypted package. The encrypted package
can reside on the doctor device for a specific period of time
during which doctor can re-access/re-use it. The enforcement
component, which is integrated into the document reader (at
client side), checks the integrity of the package and extracts the
usage control policy and the patient’s record. Figure 4 shows
the architecture of our usage control enforcement engine. The
implementation is based on XACML engine and the work of
Katt et al [8]. In general the engine consists of the following
components:
• PEP acts as single entry point to protected resources and
performs an access control. It receives the usage requests
from requester, and first makes a purpose validation
request (PVQ) and consequently receives the response
(PVR) from PVP. After receiving the positive response
2http://code.google.com/p/enterprise-java-xacml/
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from PVP, it makes a usage decision request (DQ) to PDP
1 and PDP 2 through SMP and gets the decision response
(DR) either positive or negative. Then SMP forwards the
response to PEP. PEP enforces the authorization decisions
it receives by either allowing access or denying it.
• PVP acts as a validation point for purpose, which needs to
be verified before further validation of the usage policy by
PDP 1 and PDP 2. If PVP provides a negative response,
the process ends and no further evaluation of usage policy.
In case of positive response from PVP, a further decision
request is sent to PDP 1 and PDP 2 through SMP for
further usage policy evaluation.
• PIP provides all the necessary information to PVP during
the validation state. The information provided to PVP
comes from different modules (Figure 2). Those modules
are responsible for providing information for different
types of purpose. For example, in case of emergency pur-
pose, the role to purpose alignment and medical treatment
registration modules are the sources of information.
• SMP is the dynamic part of the whole engine and
captures the continuity behavior of the access control
system. Furthermore, it manages the functions of other
elements of the architecture and ensures the transitions
from one state to another according to the extended
UCON states transition [8][11]. Initially, the SMP is in
the initial state. Upon receiving a DQ request from PEP,
the initial-request transition is triggered and SMP moves
to the requestCheck state3. In this state SMP requests
authorization and obligation decisions from the PDP 1
and the PDP 2, respectively. It is worth noting that the
change from one state to another is defined by the state
change rule [8], which is executed by the event handler.
• Event handler handles the events that trigger transitions
from one state to another. It listens to the events and sends
the trigger actions to SMP when state change is about to
occur.
• Timer can be set by the SMP through the event handler.
Timer can be used for supporting obligations with dead-
lines and obligation re-evaluation.
• PDP 1 refers to ADF function in our enforcement model
and is represented as a XACML PDP. It is the component
that evaluates attribute-related constraints (authorizations
and conditions) and renders decisions to SMP.
• PDP 2 refers to ODF function of our enforcement model.
It receives an obligation request from the SMP and checks
whether the obligation has been fulfilled. As in this paper,
we focus on purpose enforcement, we provide the detail
of its design in the following section while more detail
on the design of ODF can be found in [8].
B. Design of Purpose Validation Point
Based on our proposed model, claimed purpose of access
by requester needs to be validated by the system based on
the purpose alignment policy (which expresses how “pur-
3requestCheck is a state at which the system re-evaluates a usage policy.
6pose” should be evaluated in XML format ). The purpose of
access is classified into two types: normal and emergency.
In normal case, all the six information (Figure 2, ranging
from “action to purpose alignment” to “medical treatment
registration”, most importantly “consent/authorization”) mod-
ules need to be checked while in case of emergency access,
consent/authorization module is ignored. This means in case of
emergency, unconsented doctor can also access. After getting
information from PIP, PVP performs the evaluation process
and sends the positive or negative response to PEP. Positive
response means the purpose is valid while negative signifies
otherwise. In case of positive response, PEP goes to further
step by initiating the decision request to PDP 1 and PDP 2
through SMP. It is worth noting that the PVP acts upon every
usage request.
C. Design of the request structure
The request must contain: “User”, it can be identified by
their name or identity. “Role”, it is a role of user in a particular
institution. For example, cardiologist can be considered as user
role. It is worth noting that in our implementation, we assume
that user to role validation is done by other module and we
do not address it here. “Action on resource” is a requested
action performing on resource. For example, transfer, copy, or
read. “Resource” is a targeted object by requester. “Purpose of
access”, it is a claimed purpose by user, this is an important
element in the request, user must declare their access purpose
when initiating request. It is also worth noting that we adopt
the XACML’s request structure in our implementation where
the purpose of access is encoded in the environment attribute
specified in standard XACML request.
D. Implementation and testing
To implement our proposed system architecture, we built
five components in Java that form a usage control applica-
tion. The first component is the document reader, which is
responsible for processing the requested resource in the secure
way. The second component is PVP, which is connected to
the purpose information point. In our implementation the six
components of the purpose information point (role to purpose
alignment, .... refer to Figure 2) are encoded in XML format.
The third component is the event handler, we use Java Timer
to set a time for triggering the event during the usage session.
The fourth component is the ADF module, which is based on
the enterprise-java-xacml used for usage policy evaluation. The
fifth component is the ODF that is built based on the work of
Katt et al [8]. To test our application, we created different type
of policies for both normal and emergency situation. Based
on the result of the test, we noticed that in case of an invalid
purpose, the request response time is small. This is because
according to our proposed architecture, the system bypasses
the detail evaluation of policy ( this may involve the evaluation
of other attributes) and the decision is cut short by PVP.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we addressed the issue of purpose enforcement
in access and usage control, applied to eHealth domain as
an illustration. We proposed a classification for enforcement
mechanisms, based on the moment they happen in the access
timeline and defined pre-, ongoing-, and post-enforcement.
Building on this classification, we proposed an original model
for purpose enforcement, as well as a system architecture that
introduced some generic components that contribute to the
enforcement of access purpose. A prototype of the model has
been developed as a first step into validation.
In this paper, we only dealt with the pre- and ongoing-
enforcement cases. In the future, we plan to extend our model
to handle the post-enforcement case. We also aim at extending
the purpose enforcement engine to adopt a probabilistic behav-
ior. The intuition behind this is that in most situations, it is not
possible to get a 100 percent sure validation of the purpose of
access, or some validation can only be performed after access
has been granted, thus the need for a probabilistic approach.
Finally, we worked mainly with (variants of) the RBAC and
UCON model, and would like to extend our model to other
access control models.
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